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1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

JOLENE M. WILBER,

:

Case No. 980271-CA

Priority No. 2
Defendant/Appellant.

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for
Communications Fraud, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) (Supp. 1998), in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Anne M. Stirba, Judge, presiding.

Jurisdiction is

conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2) (e) (1996) .

See Addendum A (judgment) .

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue:

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ordering

Wilber to pay restitution for damages where the damage to the
victim1 s property was not a foreseeable result of Wilber 1 s
actions?
Standard of Review: An appellate court "will not disturb a
trial court's order of restitution unless the 'trial court
exceeds the authority prescribed by law or abuses its
discretion.'"

State v. McBride. 940 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah App.

1997) (quotation omitted).
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT

Appellant Jolene Wilber1s ("Wilber") challenge to the
restitution order is preserved on the record ("R.") for appeal at
69 [43-48] .
STATUTE
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1998), Utah's restitution
statute, is determinative of the issue on appeal.

It!s text is

included in Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
On May 24, 1997, Jolene Wilber assisted her mother, Ms.
Lieber ("Lieber")1, in negotiating the purchase of a used car
from Tim Dahle Infinity ("Tim Dahle") for $21,995.

R.69 [7-8,40] .

The car had 74,035 miles on it at the time of the agreement.
R.69 [16] .
Lieber executed a contract with Tim Dahle for the car.
R.69 [17] . She payed for the car with a check for the purchase
price drafted on the account of Matt Wilber, Appellant!s husband.
R.69 [40] . Because the check was not drawn on Lieber's account,
Tim Dahle requested that Lieber sign a promissory note that would
come due on May 31, 1997. R.69[40-42].
so.

Lieber agreed and did

R.69 [17] . Although Lieber was in possession of the car, Tim

Dahle kept the title pending the check's clearance of Matt
Wilber's account.

R.69[18-19].

attempted to cash the check.

On May 30, 1997, Tim Dahle

R.69[42].

1

The check did not clear

Ms. Lieber's name is actually "Leeper."
However, the
court reporter transcribed the name as "Lieber." Wilber refer's to
her mother by the name used in the record in order to avoid
confusion.
2

the bank and Tim Dahle never received payment for the car.
R.69 [31-32] . Tim Dahle continued to retain the title.

R.69[18] .

On June 2, 1997, Wilber sold the car to Low Book Sales ("Low
Book") for $13,500. R.69[18].

The car had 35 additional miles

on it.

R.69[18].

Low Book knowingly bought the car without the

title.

R.69[19].

Low Book requested the title from Tim Dahle on

June 10, but Tim Dahle refused to release it until Lieber paid
for the car.

R.69[19].

In August, 1997, lawyers for Wilber, Lieber, Tim Dahle and
Low Book began to negotiate for the return of the car to Tim
Dahle.

R.69[19].

Tim Dahle proposed that Wilber give back the

$13,500 to Low Book in exchange for the car.

R.69[19-20].

turn, she would return the car to Tim Dahle.

Id.

In

As a condition

of this arrangement, Tim Dahle required that it be able to
inspect the car before it took it back.

R.69[20].

Low Book indicated that it would agree to the deal, but
refused Tim Dahle access to the car throughout the summer of that
year.

R.69[21,25].

According to Don Brower ("Brower"), the

manager for Tim Dahle and the company1s representative in these
negotiations, Low Book indicated it would not cooperate because
it had not received the money from Wilber and it feared that Tim
Dahle might try to seize the car2.

R.69[38] . On September 4,

1997, Tim Dahle rescinded the initial deal because Low Book was
not cooperating with regard to the inspection.

2

R.69[36].

A representative of Low Book did not testify at Wilber1s
restitution hearing.
3

However, in the interests of a settlement, Brower subsequently
told Low Book at some point that he would accept the car without
inspection against the advice of Tim Dahle!s lawyer.

R.69[20] .

Negotiations between Tim Dahle and Low Book continued
through September 26, 1997. R.69[25].

As late as October 1,

1997, Wilber's attorney represented that she would return the
money to Low Book and the car to Tim Dahle.

R.69[26].

Although Low Book did not allow the car to be inspected, Low
Book represented that it would be available for inspection once
it received the money from Wilber throughout August of 1997.
R.69[38].

In fact, Low Book was no longer in possession of the

car, having sold it to another individual.

R.69[22].

did not inform Tim Dahle of the sale until August.

Low Book

R.69[22-23].

Low Book still did not have the title and was aware that the
contract dispute concerning the car was ongoing at the time it
sold the car.

R.69[23].

Tim Dahle ultimately retrieved the car on November 25, 1997
when it agreed to pay Low Book $50003.

R. 69 [8,25] . The car

needed detailing, had some minor body damage, plus approximately
6000 additional miles on it, all of which occurred after Low Book
sold it.

R.69 [14,34,50] . Tim Dahle estimated the recovery

costs, depreciated value and repairs to be $90004.

R.69[27].

3

It is not clear from the record how Low Book came back into
possession of the car.
4

The approximate breakdown of expenses incurred by Tim Dahle
is as follows: $5000 to retrieve the car from Low Book; $3200 in
depreciation due to excess mileage; $673 in repairs and $60 for
detailing. R.69[9-10].
4

Tim Dahle also explained that the added mileage was the most
significant loss with regard to the vehicle.

R.69[14,31].

As of

the restitution hearing date, the car was on Tim Dahle1s lot for
sale for approximately $18,000. R.69[29].
On February 12, 1998, Wilber entered a guilty plea to
communications fraud, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1)5.

R.21-22,34.

Wilber, of her own

accord, paid $13,500 to the court, which was to be disbursed
between Tim Dahle and Low Book as the court saw fit.

R.20. At

the restitution hearing, the State sought an additional $9000 in
damages on behalf of Tim Dahle.

R.69[42-43].

Wilber challenged

additional restitution on the basis that the damage resulting in
expenses to Tim Dahle, i.e. the additional mileage, body damage
and necessary detail work, occurred as a result of Low Book's
sale of the car to the other person.

R.69[43-48].

The trial court acknowledged that Low Book's "actions seemed
to have increased some of the damages here and that but for that
particular conduct, the economic loss to Dahle would be less. . .

5

The provision of the Communications Fraud statute, Utah
Code Ann. §76-10-1801, under which Wilber entered her guilty plea
provides:
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to
defraud another or to obtain from another money, property, or
anything of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions, and who
communicates directly or indirectly with any person by any
means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or
artifice is guilty of . . . (c) a third degree felony when the
value of the property, money, or thing obtained or sought to
be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000."
R.22 (plea affidavit).
5

Low Book resold the vehicle, and it was after that that . . .
so much of the additional mileage was put on the car."

R.69[50].

Accordingly, the judge "adjuste[d]" the restitution award and
ordered Wilber to pay Tim Dahle $8100.

R. 69 [51] .

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION TN ORDERING WILBER TO
PAY RESTITUTION WHERE THE VICTIM'S LOSSES WERE NOT A RESULT

OF WILBER'S ACTIONS.
Utah's restitution statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201,
provides in pertinent part:
When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other
sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the
defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided
in this subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant
has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement.
"'Restitution1 means full,

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4) (a) (i) .

partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1) (d) .

!II

Victim' means any person whom

the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result
of the defendant's criminal activities."
201(1)(e)(i).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-

"'Pecuniary damages' means all special damages,

but not general damages, which a person could recover against the
defendant in a civil action."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1) (c) .

Tim Dahle is a "victim" in this matter for purposes of the
restitution statute.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1) (e) (i) .

The trial court, however, exceeded its authority in imposing
restitution on Wilber because Wilber1s actions were not the
proximate cause of Tim Dahle's damages and, therefore, she could

6

not be held civilly liable.

See State v. McBrider 940 P.2d 539,

542 (Utah App. 1997) (where defendant does not dispute that
victim suffered pecuniary damage, "focus becomes whether [victim]
'could recover against the defendant in a civil action1")
(quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1) (c)) .
In McBride. this Court adopted a "but for" analysis for
reviewing the propriety of a restitution order under Utah's
restitution statute, and more specifically, under the provision
of the statute (determinative here) which defines pecuniary
damages as those recoverable in a civil action.

See 940 P.2d at

544 (citation omitted); see also State v. Guerrero. 896 P.2d 14,
14 (Or. App. 1995) (prerequisites for restitution include
criminal act, pecuniary damages, and "causal relationship between
the two") 6 .

McBride's analysis mirrors and is informed by civil

negligence theory, especially the principles of proximate and
superseding or intervening causation, which are instructive in
the instant case.

In this regard, the McBride Court explained

that "''a more recent negligent act may break the chain of
causation and relieve the liability of a prior negligent actor. .
. .''" if the succeeding act is not foreseeable.

Id. at 544

(quotation and citation omitted); see also Bansasine v. Bodellr
927 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah App. 1996) (same).
Under this "but for" analysis, the McBride Court upheld a
6

Utah courts have historically looked to Oregon case law for
guidance concerning restitution issues since Utah's restitution
statute is patterned after that of Oregon. See, e.g.r McBrider 940
P.2d at 543; State v. Twitchell. 832 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah App.
1992); State v. Depaoli. 835 P.2d 162, 163-64 (Utah 1992).
7

restitution award.

Id. at 543-44.

In that case, the defendant

was joyriding in a car that did not belong to him.

Id. at 540.

He was stopped by police for equipment violations.

Id.

was then impounded for registration infractions.

Id.

The car

An attempt

was made to establish ownership of the car, but was unsuccessful
since the police incorrectly transcribed the vehicle
identification number ("VIN") when the car was delivered to the
impound yard.

Id. at 541. The car was consequently sold.

Id.

Meanwhile, defendant pled guilty to joyriding and the court
ordered him to pay restitution for the balance owing on the
vehicle to the owner who was subsequently discovered.

Id.

This

Court affirmed the restitution order, reasoning that the
impoundment resulting in the sale of the car would not have
happened but for defendant's actions and that it was foreseeable
that the police would erroneously transcribe the VIN.

Id.

Under the foregoing, the trial court exceeded its authority
under section 76-3-201 in imposing restitution on Wilber because
the compensable damages suffered by Tim Dahle were the
unforeseeable result of Low Book's dealings in this matter.

See

McBrider 940 P.2d at 541 (noting that restitution order should be
vacated on appeal if the "'trial court exceeds the authority
prescribed by law'" in imposing the order) (quotation omitted).
As noted above, Utah's restitution statute allows a court to
impose restitution upon a defendant whose "criminal activity []
has resulted

in pecuniary damages."

201(4)(a)(i) (emphasis added).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-

At Wilber*s restitution hearing,
8

the court expressly acknowledged that it was Low Book's, not
Wilber1s, actions that "resulted in" the additional mileage for
which Tim Dahle was later compensated.

In the "but for" language

of McBrider the court stated:
I do have some concerns about the conduct of Low Book . . .
[T]heir actions seemed to have increased some of the damages
here and that but for that particular conduct, the economic
loss to Dahle would be less. . . . Low Book resold
the

vehicle,
and it was after that that . . . so much of
additional
mileage was put on the car.7

the

R.69[50] (emphasis added).
Where the court expressly found that Low Book's sale of the
car "resulted in pecuniary damages" in the form of lost resale
value to Tim Dahle, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a)(i), the trial
court "exceed[ed] [its] authority prescribed by law" in imposing
restitution for the added miles on Wilber; Wilber's activity did
not "result in" the added.8

Id. at 541; see also 4447 Associates

7

The car only had 35 additional miles on it when Wilber sold
it to Low Book. R.69[18] . After Tim Dahle retrieved the car from
Low Book, however, there were 6000 additional miles on it.
R.69 [34] .
8

Indeed, Wilber was making efforts to return the car to Tim
Dahle at the time that Low Book sold the car and the subsequent
damages occurred. Although a clear time line is not evident, it is
apparent from the record that at some point Wilber agreed to return
the $13,500 to Low Book and the car to Tim Dahle. R.69 [19] . As a
condition of the deal, Tim Dahle wanted to inspect the car before
accepting it back. R.69[20]. Low Book also agreed to the deal,
but refused to allow inspection of the car, claiming that it had
not received the money from Wilber. In fact, the Low Book sold the
car and it was no longer in Low Book's possession. R.69[21-23].
The fact that Wilber was trying to return the car at the time that
Low Book was selling it and causing the damages to it underscores
the court's finding that it was Low Book's, not Wilber's, actions
that "resulted in," Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (a) (i) , the damage
to the vehicle and that Wilber is therefore not appropriately held
liable under the terms of the restitution statute.
9

v. First Sec, Financial, 889 P.2d 467, 475 (Utah App. 1995)
(holding erroneous trial court's legal conclusion where it was
"contrary to its own findings of fact"). 9

Accordingly, the

restitution order should not be affirmed on appeal.

See McBride.

940 P.2d at 541.
Even if the trial court had not made such an explicit
finding as to the break in causation, the restitution award
nonetheless amounts to an abuse of discretion since the facts of
this case establish that the damage to the car not only resulted
from Low Book's actions, but were not a foreseeable consequence
of Wilber's involvement.

Id. at 543-44 (affirming restitution

order only where more recent negligent act supersedes that of
defendant and is foreseeable).
For example, as discussed above, the damages for which the
State sought compensation on behalf of Tim Dahle were caused
after Low Book sold the vehicle.

9

These damages include the added

See, e.g.. State V, Bonnie, 898 P.2d 1356, 1357-58 (Or.
App. 1995) (vacating restitution order where State failed to prove
that defendant's receipt of stolen computer resulted
in pecuniary
damages to owner; fact that computer was most recently in
defendant's possession when erasure of owner's valuable data was
discovered did not support inference that defendant caused erasure
given burglar's testimony that he, and not defendant, erased hard
drive) (emphasis added); Guerrero. 896 P.2d at 15 (Or. App. 1995)
(defendant convicted of leaving scene of accident not liable for
restitution for medical and funeral expenses where there was no
proof that fleeing scene resulted
in pecuniary damages to motorist
or his estate; mere fact that motorist survived for short time
after accident did not permit inference that injuries would not
have been fatal if he received prompt medical attention) (emphasis
added).
10

mileage ($3200)10, compensation for body ($673) and detail ($60)
damage caused by the person who bought the car from Low Book, and
$5000 to recover the vehicle.

R.69[9].

Moreover, Tim Dahle

testified that the added mileage which resulted after Low Book
sold the car was the single most significant depreciating factor.
R.69 [14,31] .
In addition, the evidence establishes that Low Book acted in
bad faith with regard to this matter.

For example, Low Book knew

that there was an ongoing contractual dispute regarding the car
and that Tim Dahle made it clear that it would not release the
title unless and until Lieber made good on the check she
presented for payment.

R.69[22-23].

Moreover, Low Book was

involved in negotiations with Wilber, Lieber and Tim Dahle for
the return of the car to Tim Dahle.

See suprar note 8. Yet,

despite the negotiations for the return of the car and without
any assurances from either Tim Dahle, Wilber or Lieber that the
title would be released in a timely manner, Low Book sold the car
to another person.

R.69[23].

Moreover, Low Book failed to inform Tim Dahle that the car
was sold, even though Tim Dahle sought repeatedly to inspect the
car throughout the summer of that year.

R.69[21-23].

Instead,

Low Book misrepresented to Tim Dahle that the car was still in

10

Upon cross-examination, Tim Dahle explained that it
readjusted this depreciation value from $3200 to $1450 just prior
to the February 20, 1998 restitution hearing.
R.69 [14].
As
explained by Tim Dahle's representative, the amount of mileage a
car has becomes less significant with regard to pricing the longer
the car sits on a dealer's lot. R.69[31].
11

its possession and claimed that the reason it refused to allow
the car to be inspected was because it never received payment
from Wilber.

Id.

It was not until August, 1997, that Low Book

finally disclosed that the car was no longer in its possession.
R.69 [22] .
In addition, Low Book's bad faith dealings are underscored
given that Low Book is a licensed dealership with a professional
responsibility to act ethically.

As a dealer, Low Book had a

professional responsibility to refrain from selling the car to a
non-dealer until it received the title or at least some assurance
that the title would be forthcoming.

Given Low Book's

professional role in this matter, it was not foreseeable that the
it would in bad faith sell the car to another person where the
issue of title was still up in the air.
Under the foregoing facts, the unforseeability of Low Book's
intervening actions in this matter are distinguishable from the
intervening actions of the officers in McBrider which this court
held to be foreseeable in affirming the restitution award imposed
against the defendant in that case.

See 940 P.2d at 543-44.

The

officers at the impound yard in McBride, unlike Low Book, were
acting in good faith pursuant to their professional
responsibilities when they accidentally

miscopied the VIN number

on the victim's automobile, leading to its subsequent sale.

Id.

at 544.
Low Book, by contrast, acted in contravention of its duty as
a licensed dealer when it purposefully
12

sold the car to another

while the title dispute was ongoing.
Book lied

R.69[23].

Moreover, Low

to Tim Dahle about the car when Tim Dahle sought to

inspect it, thereby prolonging the dispute and creating the
situation leading up to the damage to the car.

R.69[22,25].

If

Low Book had been dealing honestly in this matter and in accord
with its professional responsibility, the car would not have been
sold and, consequently, the additional miles and body damage
would have been avoided altogether.

Hence, unlike the defendant

in McBride. who "created the opportunity for the [VIN]
transcription error," Wilber did not "create" the opportunity
leading to the damage to the car so much as Low Book did by
virtue of its intentional bad faith dealings in this matter.

940

P.2d at 544.
In sum, where Low Book sold the car notwithstanding the
contractual dispute regarding the title and in contravention of
its professional responsibility as a licensed dealership, and
where the damages for which the State sought compensation were
caused as a result of Low Book's sale of the car, such actions
were not foreseeable to Wilber and represented a break in the
causal relationship between herself and the damage to the
vehicle, thereby relieving Wilber of liability.

Id. r* seer e . g. r

Bansasine, 927 P.2d at 677 (affirming that other driver's firing
of gun into defendant's car was not reasonably foreseeable result
of defendant's rude and reckless driving, and thus defendant's
driving was not proximate cause of passenger's injuries).
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in imposing
13

restitution.
In addition to exceeding its authority under the restitution
statute in contravention of its own finding and the evidence
which establishes a break in the causal relationship between
Wilber and the damages to Tim Dahle, the court similarly abused
its discretion in imposing $8100 in restitution where the
evidence regarding the actual monetary value of the damages, as
well as information that Tim Dahle was back in possession of the
car and that Wilber had already deposited $13,500 with the court,
does not support the dollar amount of the restitution order.
The State presented evidence at the restitution hearing that
established the value of Tim Dahle's losses to be $3200 in
depreciation for the 6000 additional miles, $673 for body work
and $63 in detailing to repair damage to the body of the car that
also occurred after Low Book sold the car, plus $5000 to buy the
car back from Low Book.

R.69[9-10].

In addition to this

evidence, the court was informed that the car had only 35
additional miles on it when it sold the car to Low Book,
R.69[18], and that Tim Dahle had the car and that Wilber had
turned over the $13,500 that she received from Low Book for the
car to the court one month prior to the restitution hearing.
R.20,34.

Based on this information, the judge ordered Wilber to

pay restitution but reduced the amount from the requested $9000
to $8100, explaining "the difference between the approximate
$9000 and $8100 awarded . . . represents the difference in what I
think the efforts of Low Book were that actually impacted on the
14

increased loss."

R.69[51-52].

In the first place, the restitution order is unwarranted in
this case since Wilber satisfied any liability she had with
regard to the car and Tim Dahle. As the record indicates, Wilber
returned the $13,500 that she received from Low Book when she
sold the car.

R.69[28].

Moreover, when she sold the car to Low

Book, it had only 35 additional miles on it, which means that the
car was in essentially the same condition, and worth the same
amount of money ($21,995), as when she originally bought it from
Tim Dahle less than a month before11.

R.69[8,18].

In addition,

Tim Dahle was back in possession of the car at the time of the
restitution hearing.

R.69[28].

Accordingly, Wilber satisfied

her liability in this instance; Tim Dahle had its car and Wilber
relinquished the $13,500 she received for the car from Low Book.
This is true even considering the added mileage, body damage, and
recovery costs given that, as the court found, those costs
occurred as a result of Low Book!s uncooperative participation in
this matter.

See supra.

Furthermore, even assuming that additional restitution was
appropriate here, the $8100 order is excessive and does not
accurately reflect the costs to Tim Dahle that resulted from Low
Book's actions. As noted above, the trial court reduced the
original $9000 award requested by the State to $8100 on the basis
that Low Book was responsible for at least the additional mileage

11

At most, Wilber may be liable for restitution for the
additional 35 miles that she put on the car.
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on the car.

R.69[50].

This $900 discount, however, does not

even approximate the actual monetary value of the added mileage
($3200) or body ($673) and detail ($63) work required on account
of Low Book's actions.

R.69[9-10].

Moreover, the trial court's

ruling is inconsistent insofar as it accounts for the added
mileage, but not the body damage and recovery costs, which also
occurred as a result of Low Book's bad faith, uncooperative
behavior.

Considering the total of these sums alone, any award,

assuming one was appropriate, should have been discounted by at
least $3936.
Based on the foregoing, Wilber urges this court to vacate
the restitution award and remand for a new hearing.

The trial

court exceeded its statutory authority to impose restitution
where it expressly found that Low Book's actions, not Wilber's,
resulted in the damage for which the State sought compensation on
Tim Dahle's behalf.

Moreover, Low Book's bad faith dealings in

this matter were not a foreseeable consequence of Wilber's
initial involvement.

Finally, the dollar amount of the award

does not accurately reflect the actual amount of the damages that
were attributable to Low Book's actions, let alone the fact that
Tim Dahle was already in possession of the car and the fact that
Wilber had deposited $13,500 with the court in satisfaction of
her liability.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Wilber respectfully requests this
court to vacate the restitution order and remand for a new
16

restitution hearing.
SUBMITTED this Sl^A.

day of November, 1998.

CATHERINE L. BEGIC
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

REBECCA C. HYDE
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

L^LFVli.
Junns&iiEHT
3rd DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE CF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMXITMEN:

vs.

Case No: S71020995 FS

J0L2NZ M WILBZR,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

PRESENT
Prosecutor: REBECCA C HYDE
ROBERT STOTT
Defendant

ANNE M. STIRBA
March 15, 1993

"2-2-"2- \ 2 ^

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birrh: April 5, 1955
Video
Tape Number:
9:19
Clerk:
marcyt
CHARGES
2. COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/02/1998 Guilty Plea
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD a 3rd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
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Case No: 971020995
Date:
Mar 16, 1393

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Senter.ce is to run consecutive with sentence now serving.
Court recommends credit for time served.

The

ORDER OF PROBATION

Defendant is to pay $8100 restitution as previously prdered.
Dated this \ \0 --day of V^&JUCJK

19^fp.

ANNE M. STIRBA
District Court Judge

Page 2 (last)
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ADDENDUM B

UT ST § 76-3-201, Sentences or combination of sentences
allowed--Civil penalties--Restitution--Hearing--Definitions
Utah Code § 76-3-201
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 76. CRIMINAL CODE
CHAPTER 3. PUNISHMENTS
PART 2. SENTENCING
Current through End of 1997 General and 1st
and 2nd Sp. Sess.

§ 76-3-201. Sentences or combination of
sentences
allowed—Civil
penaltiesRestitution—Hearing—Definitions
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(e)(i) "Victim" means any person whom the
court determines has suffered pecuniary
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal
activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any
coparticipant in the defendant's criminal
activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this
chapter, a court may sentence a person
convicted of an offense to any one of the
following sentences or combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;

(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and

(b) to removal or disqualification from public
or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically
provided by law;

(ii) plea of guilty.
(d) to imprisonment;
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of
which the defendant is convicted or any other
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or
without an admission of committing the
criminal conduct.

(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison
without parole; or
(g) to death.

(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special
damages, but not general damages, which a
person could recover against the defendant in a
civil action arising out of the facts or events
constituting the defendant's criminal activities
and includes the money equivalent of property
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed,
and losses including earnings and medical
expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or
nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a
victim, including the accrual of interest from the
time of sentencing, insured damages, and
payment for expenses to a governmental entity
for extradition or transportation and as further
defined in Subsection (4)(c).

(3)(a) This chapter does not deprive a court of
authority conferred by law to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
*22162 (vi) impose any other civil penalty.
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a
sentence.
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UT ST § 76-3-201, Sentences or combination of sentences
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(4)(a)(i) When a person is convicted of
criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary
damages, in addition to any other sentence it
may impose, the court shall order that the
defendant make restitution to victims of crime
as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for
which the defendant has agreed to make
restitution as part of a plea agreement. For
purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning
as defined in Section 77-38-2 and family
member has the meaning as defined in Section
77-37-2.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is
appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria
and procedures as provided in Subsections
(4)(c)and(4)(d).
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes
restitution, the clerk of the court shall enter an
order of complete restitution as defined in
Subsection (8)(b) on the civil judgment docket
and provide notice of the order to the parties.
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment
enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and the person in whose favor the
restitution order is entered may seek
enforcement of the restitution order in
accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. In addition, the Department of
Corrections may, on behalf of the person in
whose favor the restitution order is entered,
enforce the restitution order as judgment
creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order
for payment of restitution and the victim or
department elects to pursue collection of the
order by civil process, the victim shall be
entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees.
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes
a lien when recorded in a judgment docket and
shall have the same effect and is subject to the
same rules as a judgment for money in a civil
action. Interest shall accrue on the amount
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ordered from the time of sentencing.
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall
make rules permitting the restitution payments
to be credited to principal first and the
remainder of payments credited to interest in
accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(b)(i) If a defendant has been extradited to this
state under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradition, to
resolve pending criminal charges and is
convicted of criminal activity in the county to
which he has been returned, the court may, in
addition to any other sentence it may impose,
order that the defendant make restitution for
costs expended by any governmental entity for
the extradition.
*22163 (ii) In determining whether restitution
is appropriate, the court shall consider the
criteria in Subsection (4)(c).
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall
determine complete restitution and courtordered restitution.
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution
necessary to compensate a victim for all losses
caused by the defendant.
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the
restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction
orders the defendant to pay as a part of the
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing.
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered
restitution shall be determined as provided in
Subsection (8).
(d)(i) If the court determines that restitution is
appropriate or inappropriate under this
subsection, the court shall make the reasons for
the decision a part of the court record.
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to
enforce the judgment, the defendant shall be
entitled to offset any amounts that have been
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paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the
victim.
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution
constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment
docket and shall have the same effect and is
subject to the same rules as a judgment for
money in a civil action. Interest shall accrue on
the amount ordered from the time of sentencing.
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make
rules permitting the restitution payments to be
credited to principal first and the remainder of
payments credited to interest in accordance with
Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act.
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition,
amount, or distribution of the restitution, the
court shall at the time of sentencing allow the
defendant a full hearing on the issue.
(5)(a) In addition to any other sentence the
court may impose, the court shall order the
defendant to pay restitution of governmental
transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from
one county to another within the state at
governmental expense to resolve pending
criminal charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C
misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to
pay restitution of governmental transportation
expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction
or on a subsequent failure to appear a warrant is
issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant
to a court order.

Copyright
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*22164 (c)(i) Restitution of governmental
transportation expenses under Subsection (a)(i)
shall be calculated according to the following
schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is
transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant
is transported; and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is
transported.
(ii) The schedule of restitution under
Subsection (c)(i) applies to each defendant
transported regardless of the number of
defendants actually transported in a single trip.
(6)(a) If a statute under which the defendant
was convicted mandates that one of three stated
minimum terms shall be imposed, the court
shall order imposition of the term of middle
severity unless there are circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either
party may submit a statement identifying
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or
presenting additional facts. If the statement is
in writing, it shall be filed with the court and
served on the opposing party at least four days
prior to the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are
circumstances that justify imposition of the
highest or lowest term, the court may consider
the record in the case, the probation officer's
report, other reports, including reports received
under Section 76-3-404, statements in
aggravation or mitigation submitted by the
prosecution or the defendant, and any further
evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the
facts supporting and reasons for imposing the
upper or lower term.
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(e) The court in determining a just sentence
shall consider sentencing guidelines regarding
aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice.
(7) If during the commission of a crime
described as child kidnaping, rape of a child,
object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or
sexual abuse of a child, the defendant causes
substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the
charge is set forth in the information or
indictment and admitted by the defendant, or
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the
defendant shall be sentenced to the highest
minimum term in state prison. This subsection
takes precedence over any conflicting provision
of law.
(8)(a) For the purpose of determining
restitution for an offense, the offense shall
include any criminal conduct admitted by the
defendant to the sentencing court or to which
the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A
victim of an offense, that involves as an element
a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal
activity, includes any person directly harmed by
the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of
the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.
*22165 (b) In determining the monetary sum
and other conditions for complete restitution,
the court shall consider all relevant facts,
including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense
resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of
property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related
professional services and devices relating to
physical, psychiatric, and psychological care,
including nonmedical care and treatment
rendered in accordance with a method of
healing recognized by the law of the place of
treatment; the cost of necessary physical and
occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and the
income lost by the victim as a result of the
offense if the offense resulted in bodily injury to
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a victim; and
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related
services if the offense resulted in the death of a
victim.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other
conditions for court-ordered restitution, the
court shall consider the factors listed in
Subsection (b) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and
the burden that payment of restitution will
impose, with regard to the other obligations of
the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay
restitution on an installment basis or on other
conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant
of the payment of restitution and the method of
payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court
determines make restitution inappropriate.
(d) The court may decline to make an order or
may defer entering an order of restitution if the
court determines that the complication and
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a
result of considering an order of restitution
under this subsection, substantially outweighs
the need to provide restitution to the victim.
Amended by Laws 1994, c. 13; Laws 1995, c. Ill, § 1, eff
May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 117, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995;
Laws 1995, c. 301, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c.
337, § 1, eff May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, 1st Sp.Sess., c. 10,
§ 1, eff April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 40, § 1, eff April
29, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 79, § 98, eff April 29, 1996;
Laws 1996, c. 241, §§2, 3, eff April 29, 1996
HISTORICAL NOTES
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Section 6(2) of Laws 1995, c. 301 provides:
"If H.B. 333 [c. 301] and H.B. 113 [c. 117] both pass in
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